

# TYOLOGY OF REVOLUTION: HISTORY OF CREATION AND MODERN STATE

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Revolution typologization is an important problem from the point of view of further development of the theory of revolution, specifying their common features and regularities. The article studies of approaches and methods of classification of such social and political phenomenon as revolution from the point of view of identification of types of revolutions, since the first such attempts in the middle of the XIX century and till today. The author observes in details K. Marx's concepts and their development in Marxism of the XX century, ideas of types of revolutions of the first third of the XX century at R. Michels and G. Piety, approaches of social researchers of the second half of the XX century - S. Eisenstadt, S. Huntington, T. Skocpol, J. Goldstone. Despite numerous attempts to build a harmonic system of typologization criteria all the systems of revolution types induce many questions and critique. Among them being the absence of a unified identifier, uncertainty in differentiation of the types specified, and ignoring some peculiar features of a revolution. The author does the analysis of a current state of a problem of a tipologization of revolutions, including, through a prism of the modern phenomena of so-called "velvet" and "color revolutions", for explaining of which the concept of democratization and its waves and democratic transit is applied. He also concludes that the last having no signs of revolutionary changes, which particularly do not result in socio-political transformation. This proves that the absence of precise rendering the revolution notion results in eroding the phenomenon boundaries.

*Key words:* Revolution, theory of revolution, classification of revolutions, typology of revolution.

One of the main problems in studying of revolutions is a question of a typologization. This problem has appeared from the first steps of "the theory of revolution" beginnings and exists till today. Without classification all revolutions remain a set of passed revolutions which don't have common features and regularities, and can't be respectively subject to system studying as the phenomenon, and only as separate elements. For this reason any attempts of theoretical studying of revolutions as special phenomenon from the very first steps have been connected with attempts of classification and definition of types.

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Events of the Netherlands, English, Great French revolution and the European revolutions of 1848-49 gave a plentiful material for the first generalizations and origin to "the theory of revolution". The first sign of various types of revolutions are found in the middle of the XIX century, and their author is the German social philosopher Karl Marx. Marx knew three types of revolution. First, bourgeois – revolution, that terminated a feudal system in England and France; secondly, proletarian, it is socialist or communistic revolution which will establish dictatorship of the proletariat and will cancel exploitation. There was also a certain intermediate option – revolutions in the capitalist countries of Europe where the proletariat still in the union with the bourgeoisie and not solving problems of establishment of dictatorship of the proletariat was the main driving class. Further those revolutions received the name “bourgeois-democratic” in Marxist terminology. Revolutions of 1848-49 in Europe became an example of such revolutions.

Marx builds his typology of revolutions on class definition, whose interests are realized during this revolution. "In 1648, – Marx wrote, – the bourgeoisie in the union with the new nobility fought against a monarchy, against the feudal nobility and against dominating church. In 1789 the bourgeoisie in the union with the people fought against a monarchy, the nobility and dominating church". "In both revolutions the bourgeoisie was that class which really was at the head of movement. The proletariat and layers of urban population not belonging to the bourgeoisie neither had still separate interests of the bourgeoisie, nor compose yet independently developed classes or parts of a class" [Marx, 1957, s. 114].

The Netherlands didn't match to the Marx concept of revolutions therefore Marx actually ignored it, and, generally, argues on the basis of English and French revolutions. Marx tried to call events of 1566-1609 in the Netherlands not revolution, but revolt of Netherlanders against Spain [Marx, 1957, p. 114]. Netherlands revolution was a national liberation revolution, and that was the principle difference of it, but Marx was interested in class struggle and change of ways of production in revolutions.

Essential distinctions which Marx found in bourgeois revolutions of the Netherlands, England and France were written off by him on age difference and immaturity of the first two. "Revolution of 1648 represented revolution of the seventeenth century in relation to the sixteenth, revolution of 1789 was a victory of the eighteenth century over the seventeenth. Those revolutions expressed in much bigger degree the

needs of all world of that time, than requirement of those parts of the world where they happened, i.e. England and France" [Marx, 1957, p. 115]. "Revolution of 1789 had the prototype (at least, in Europe) only in revolution of 1648, and revolution of 1648 had it only in the revolt of Netherlanders against Spain. Each of those revolutions went for century forward in comparison with the prototypes not only in time, but also in contents" [Marx, 1957, p. 114].

Marx called the Commune of Paris of 1871 an example of proletarian revolution [Marx, 1960, s. 339]. Revolutions of 1848-49 in Europe, which began to be called bourgeois-democratic, Marx considered as revolutions which developed on descending, unlike previous revolutions which went in the line of ascent [Revoljucii 1848-1849, 1952, s. 436, 443, 447-449]. Moreover, a number from those revolutions, in particular, in Germany, represented, according to Marx's statement, "anachronism", "an echo of the European revolution in the backward country" [Marx, 1957, p. 115].

The Marxism of the XX century recognizes bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic, people's democratic, socialist (proletarian, communistic) revolutions and national liberation revolutions. Bourgeois revolution is directed on overthrow of a feudal system, socialist (proletarian) is aimed at elimination of capitalism and creation of communist society [Bol'shaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija, 1955, p. 320; Bol'shaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija, 1957, p. 174; Filsofskaja enciklopedija, 1960, s. 202; Filsofskij jenciklopedicheski slovar', 1983, s. 66, 632]. Revolutions of 1848-49 in Europe, as well as the Commune of Paris of 1871, brought methodological chaos because, first of all, occurred already in the capitalist countries, i.e., they couldn't be "bourgeois", but revolutions of 1848-49 precisely weren't proletarian, and the Commune of Paris caused questions about it.

V. I. Lenin in 1917 in work "The state and revolution" tried to modify Marx's scheme, entering additional "prefix" "national" to bourgeois revolution. Marx considered, according to Lenin, the actual ratio of classes in the majority of the continental states of Europe in 1871, on which he was oriented. "In Europe, in 1871, the proletariat did not constitute the majority of the people in any country on the Continent. A "people's" revolution, one actually sweeping the majority into its stream, could be such only if it embraced both the proletariat and the peasants. These two classes then constituted the "people"" [Lenin, 1974, s. 421-422]. That is, from "bourgeois" revolutions the "people" bourgeois revolutions are distinguished by class composition: the union of the poorest peasants with

proletarians [Lenin, 1974, s. 422]. Proceeding from Lenin's some remarks, the Commune of Paris belonged to such type of revolutions [Lenin, 1974, s. 422]. Also Lenin referred the Russian revolution of 1905-07 to such type of revolutions [Lenin, 1974, s. 421]. Further in Marxist classification those revolutions received the name bourgeois-democratic and were presented with links to the provided Lenin quotes.

*"The bourgeois revolutions which have taken place in a number of countries of Western Europe in 1848, showed that their main feature, unlike early bourgeois revolutions, was that they passed during the period when the working class acted on political arena, having made the demands, having already the first rudiments of the independent class organization. Though the proletariat also was still weak, but the bourgeoisie already was afraid of him and therefore didn't decide safely, up in arms to finish feudal reaction"* [Bol'shaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija, 1955, p. 320].

Definition of these revolutions have taken the following form: Bourgeois-democratic revolution is "such bourgeois revolution in which the enormous majority of the people, workers and the peasants crushed by oppression and exploitation, makes the economic and political requirements" [Bol'shaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija, 1955, p, 320]. Till 1917 only "unsuccessful" revolutions got to the category of these revolutions (or revolutions "on descending"). After 1917 there was only one successful revolution got to their category – February revolution of 1917 in Russia. Bourgeois-democratic revolutions became the main type for the imperialism period in countries where socialist revolutions didn't occur or didn't win or where it was necessary to find a binding thread with a socialist revolution in the absence of a previous bourgeois revolution. The following signs were attributed to that type of revolutions as main: participation in revolution of the main mass of the people – workers and peasants, existence of the revolutionary proletariat, existence of powerful agrarian and country movement [Bol'shaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija, 1955, p. 320; Filosofskaja enciklopedija, 1960, s. 203; Filosofskij jenciklopedicheski slovar', 1983, s. 67].

People's democratic revolution is the same result of a compromise in discussed system of typologization, as well as bourgeois-democratic revolutions, and this compromise is aimed, mainly, on classification of revolutions which have happened in countries of Eastern Europe and Third World countries in the XX century and haven't matched the existing

classification. This type of revolutions has received the possibility to have bourgeois-democratic or socialist character [Bol'shaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija, 1955, p. 186].

*"A new form of bourgeois-democratic revolution were people's democratic revolutions in China and in some European countries of national democracy" [Filosofskaja enciklopedija, 1960, s. 203]. People's democratic are revolutions, "headed by the proletariat, based on the union of workers and the peasants, finishing the solution of all-democratic tasks and by that opening a way to a socialism" [Bol'shaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija, 1955, p. 186].*

National liberation revolution grows from national liberation movement and is directed on destruction of alien domination, a gain of national independence, elimination of national and colonial oppression [Filosofskaja enciklopedija, 1967, s. 9; Filosofskij jenciklopedicheski slovar', 1983, s. 415]. Due to this type of revolutions has no relation to a classifying factor – change of a way of production and a formation – that revolution of the XVI century in the Netherlands, on all signs relating to national liberation revolutions, has been attributed as `bourgeois`, and national liberation fight of the colonial people of the XX century is referred to type of bourgeois-democratic movements [Filosofskaja enciklopedija, 1960, s. 203].

Summing up the result of representation of types of revolutions at Marx and in Marxism, we should note a lack of a uniform classifying sign because of what the system not only loses symmetry, but also loses any sense. If revolutions are urged to change a way of production (or formations), there is a question of lack of the revolutions changing a primitive-communal system on slaveholding and from slaveholding formation for the feudal. All Marxist literature tries to bypass this question, substituting revolutionary transition by other concepts:

*"The history knows revolts of slaves against slaveholders, revolts of serfs against landowners, anti-feudal bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions of an era of rising capitalism and an imperialism era, proletarian socialist revolutions" [Bol'shaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija, 1955, p. 186].*

The second question is proletarian revolution, which, if to take Marx's position for definition into consideration, hasn't been in the history of mankind. Marx's declared that proletarian revolutions happen, when the

proletariat becomes the most mass class: proletarian revolution, "is possible only where together with capitalist production the industrial proletariat takes, at least, an important place in national scale" [Marx, 1961, p. 612]. Socialist and communistic revolutions also haven't happen, if we follow the definition, that this revolutions have to establish socialism (or communism) according to Marx meaning, or it is necessary to reconsider the definition "socialist" ("proletarian", "communistic") revolutions. If bourgeois-democratic revolutions are rather frequent phenomenon in Europe, that, probably, there is a regularity, and they have "purposes and tasks" (for example, they "solve" problems, unsolved in the country with previous revolution), and it is incorrect to consider them as an atavism and revolutions on descending only because they "didn't grow" to a socialist revolution, or to see in them only a step of development into a socialist revolution.

The second half of the XX century was marked by attempts to return life to Marxism and to upgrade the doctrine. So, an interesting conception of two Soviet historians M. A. Barg and E.B. Chernyak was presented in the 80th. From the authors' point of view there were "classical bourgeois revolutions" which solved "world problems" of the time, and national revolutions which "represent specific manifestations of the same requirements, however in the form deformed by local conditions" [Barg, Chernjak, 1990, p. 221]. "Great revolutions define mainly capitalism development deep into, others, simultaneous with them, direct capitalism in breadth. The first define formation progress as whole, the second, and it is especially brightly shown in synchronous cycles of revolutions, provide its expansion in space, emergence and functioning of its regional versions" [Barg, Chernjak, 1990, p. 222]. The authors designate 'interformational' revolutions as "basic", which "carried out breaking of the foundations of the feudal relations, as it took place in England of the XVII century and in France at the end of the XVIII century, the first attempts of reduction of a political superstructure in compliance with basis" [Barg, Chernjak, 1990, p. 227]. "Intraformational" revolutions are given the status "superstructural" as in their result "full or incomplete reduction of a superstructure in compliance with basis was carried out" [Barg, Chernjak, 1990, p. 227]. Further authors introduce into practice criterion of a stageness and complicate classification by introduction of types and subspecies: 1) interformational and intraformational; 2) interformational, interstage and intrastage; 3) interstage and intrastage [Barg, Chernjak, 1990, p. 231]. In a general view, without specification of all

subparagraphs, from the point of view of Barg and Chernyak, "bourgeois revolutions of the XVI-XIX centuries on their objective tasks and results (the historical contents) can be divided on: 1) interformational (transition from a feudal formation to capitalist); 2) intraformational interstadial (transition from a stage to a stage or "leaping" through a stage); 3) intraformational intrastage" [Barg, Chernjak, 1990, p. 224]. All this set of interformational, intraformational and interstage revolutions with a set of subspecies and the mixed types conducts to very difficult designs and, the main thing, doesn't facilitate understanding a phenomenon of revolutions, their versions. At the same time, many questions to Marx's and marxism's typologization remain without answer. This attempt to give a new impulse to "Marxist approach" to revolutions says that this typologization possesses a certain resilience, but doesn't satisfy as it stands, and also shows complexity and relevance of questions of typology of revolutions nowadays.

Classification of revolutions, of course, developed and out of Marxism.

The German sociologist Robert Michels in the 30th of the XX century divided revolutions on "revolutionary" and "reactionary". The first type is the French revolutions of 1789, 1830 and 1848, the Commune of Paris, the German and Austrian revolutions of 1918 and many others; the second type is a putsch of bakers in France in 1889, movement in Germany, connected with the names of Kapp and Hitler, successful in Italy in 1923 fascist revolution [Michels, 2000, s. 108]. From the point of view of the purposes of revolutionaries in these revolutions and their tasks, in revolution of the first type, on Michels, revolutionaries "seek to achieve the actions of set of the objectives, which historically were not achieved yet anywhere in the world, or at least in their country, whereas counterrevolutionary "revolutionaries" try to realize with similarly externally the purposes, which have been already reached in the past" [Michels, 2000, s. 108].

Meanwhile, Michels underlines, that the first type isn't characterized at all by one hopes for new orders, that there is a revival of images of freedom from the past (ideas of freedom from antiquity, memories of the civil rights in medieval communes, etc.), also as for the second type the complete recovery of old regimes isn't peculiar, and it marks rather a compromise at which in this or that form lessons are learned from history of falling of an old regime [Michels, 2000, s. 109].

This classification, with rare exception [e.g., Johari J.C. 1987, p. 427], hasn't got neither support, nor followers, and, probably, first of all due to the fact, that the second type of revolutions, on Michels, isn't a revolution, and all revolutions, which have happened at that time, are covered by the first type, i.e. division and typologization don't happen at all.

One of the first researchers of "theory of revolution" George Pettee suggested to allocate five types of revolutions.

1. «Private palace revolution» (actually, it's overturn, which involves a small amount of people).

2. «Public palace revolution» (“There may be movements of troops about a city and a small battle at the palace. The public knows that something is going on, but it did not initiate the event, and takes little part in it”).

3. The rebellion of an area against rule by the government of another country. (“Such a movement arises from large-scale social factors, involves large-scale military action, or at least the realistic threat of such action, and strong popular support”).

4. The great national revolutions. (The classic examples are the French and the Russian Revolutions. “A ruling class, separated from a formerly passive people by the privileges of power and property and culture, has remained isolated, has decayed in function, in leadership capacity, and in motivation toward measures needed for the growth and advancement of the society or community. Here we have a mass phenomenon, a people rejecting its government and the ruling class”).

5. Systemic revolution (Pettee addresses mostly to the Ancient World. This type of revolution referred to is not the internal social and political system; rather it is the system of state organization, the type state, for a wider human area than a single state [Pettee, 1966, p. 15-17].

Let's note, that the first, second and fifth type, according to all definitions, doesn't belong to revolutions, the third and the fourth represent type of that it is accepted to call "classical" and national liberation revolution.

The Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt divides revolutions into "modern": Netherlands, English, American and French, – with which modernization of the feudal West was followed, and "late modern" – revolutions of the XIX-XX centuries, by which modernization of traditional societies of other types was accompanied. Modern revolutions (revolutions of Modern times) became models and symbols of changes and

created an image of "pure revolution". Eisenstadt considers that there is a small probability, that in late modern or industrial societies there will be such combination of protest movements and to profound structural changes, which corresponds to an image of pure revolution. Eisenstadt pays a special attention to modernization processes in revolution, claiming that rates and results of modernization are various in the different countries and revolutions, and each society is modernized according to the cultural essence [Eisenstadt, 1999, s. 15, 31, 52-53, 57, 83, 223, 262, 374].

The English historian Eric Hobsbawm, actually, supports a typologization of Eisenstadt, because he considers, that "there may be a fundamental difference between the revolutions of the era of bourgeois liberalism (and perhaps earlier revolutions, if they are accepted as such), and the revolutions of the twentieth century" [Hobsbawm, 1986, p. 26]. First, they have a different economic basis, secondly, revolutions of the XX century reduce to insignificant situation or deny the lawful political structure established by the constitution on what bourgeois revolutions placed emphasis [Hobsbawm, 1986, p. 28, 31]. Besides, Hobsbawm separately allocates revolutions in obsolete empires, which were doomed to extinction [Hobsbawm, 1999, s. 402-434]. First of all, he speaks about revolutions of the beginning of the XX century in China, the Ottoman Empire and Russia [Hobsbawm, 1999, s. 404]. The author divides all such revolutions into revolutions in empires European and non-European [Hobsbawm, 1999, s. 406].

Here there are some questions to Hobsbawm's conclusions. First, the statement for aspiration of early revolutions to the constitution and lawful political structure has to become with a set of reservations. For example, the constitution written by revolution of 1789 didn't come into force, and regimes of Cromwell, Jacobins and Napoleon were not more limited (if not less), than the overthrown monarchs. Moreover, "the lawful political structure" existed after revolutions in all "the socialist countries" of Eastern Europe and USSR, and, represented in certain time the most democratic option of a state system (at least, on paper). As for idea of the English historian of association by the principle of `obsolete empires`, revolutions in Mexico, German of 1918 and 1919 and Hungarian of 1919, at least, drop out of this logical row (for the end of the XIX - beginning of the XX century, which the author sorts).

This typologization got a great number of followers, dividing revolutions on "classical" and "others", or revolutions in the developed countries and revolution in the backward countries [Laue, 1964, p. 16;

Tucker, 1969, p. 137-138]. Derivative of this approach is division on 1) "West" and "East" revolutions [Huntington, 2004, s. 271-278], 2) revolutions of the third world and all the others [Foran, 2005, p. 1, 18-24].

In the summary work "Revolution" (1966) K. Friedrich proposes to distinguish European revolutions in the XVII-XIX centuries, as revolutions directed toward the establishment of constitutional regimes, and revolutions of the twentieth century, directed mostly toward the alteration of the political order. Moreover, Friedrich calls constitutional revolutions `limited` and attributes to this type all revolutions happen after the II World War and revolutions in the formerly colonial world. [Friedrich, 1966, p. 7].

The big group of the American political scientists and sociologists, leading by recognized authorities on area of "theory of revolution" Jack Goldstone and Tedd Gurr, would like to see in revolutions of the "late 20th century" other forms of the conflict, explaining that these revolutions are not "classical" on model (template) of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, they are alternative model [Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, 1991, p. 3]. For all authors adhering to such division, revolutions in underdeveloped countries become means of overcoming of backwardness and act as the modernization tool [Huntington, 2004, s. 271-278; Foran, 2005, p. 18-24; Laue, 1964, p. 16; Tucker, 1969, p. 137-138].

The American political scientist Samuel Huntington polemizes with a typologization by the principle of division on "great", or social and economic, revolutions and shocks of more limited scale which are characterized as "purely" political. The author is sure, that the most considerable results of great revolutions, anyway, lie within the political sphere, or directly are connected with it. Full-scale revolution, according to Huntington, assumes destruction of old political institutes and legitimacy forms, mobilization of new groups in policy, redefinition of political community, acceptance of new political values and new concepts about political legitimacy, new more dynamic elite and creation of stronger political institutes. [Huntington, 2004, s. 310].

Huntington carries out a typologization on the basis of sequence and a ratio of three components (stages) of any revolution: 1) violent destruction of existing political institutes, 2) mobilization of new groups in policy and 3) creation of new political institutes [Huntington, 2004, s 271]. In the "Western" model of revolutions, how it's called by Huntington, at first political institutes of an old regime are wrecked; it's followed with mobilization of new groups in policy, and then creation of new political

institutes comes. The "Eastern" revolution, on the contrary, begins with mobilization of new groups in policy and creations of new political institutes and comes to an end with violent overthrow of political institutes of an old system. French, Russian, Mexican and, at the first stages, Chinese revolutions came nearer to the western model; the latest phases of the Chinese revolution, the Vietnamese revolution and other cases of colonial fight against imperialistic powers followed `eastern` model. Huntington writes, that as a whole, the sequence of phases is more accurately expressed in the western revolution, than in revolution of eastern type. In the last all three phases are usually carried out more or less at the same time. There is, however, one fundamental distinction in sequence of phases between two types of revolutions. In the western revolution political mobilization is a consequence of crash of an old regime; it serves in east revolution as the reason of its crash [Hantington, 2004, s. 271].

The second distinctive, according to Huntington, is radicalism of warring parties and their change. The researcher writes that in the western revolution the main fight usually happens between moderates and radicals; in east revolution it occurs between revolutionaries and the government. The moderates are short time in power in the western revolution – between falling of an old regime, expansion of limits of political activity and coming to power of radicals. In revolution of eastern type moderates much more weakly; they don't take imperious positions at all, and as revolution develops, they become victims of the governments, or revolutionaries, or are compelled by process of polarization to join this or that party [Hantington, 2004, s. 278].

The third distinctive feature is "capital character" of "the western revolution" (revolutionaries move from the capital to rural areas to put it under the control) and rural character of "eastern revolution" (revolutionaries from the remote rural areas make the way in the center and eventually seize the capital) [Hantington, 2004, s. 276-277].

Here again it is a question of revolutions before the beginning of the XX century, so-called "classical", and revolutions of the XX century in Third World countries, behind that exception that the term "eastern revolution" is the incorrect name as according to this scenario revolutions have been also developing in Latin America.

For demonstration of intermediate approaches which suffer still big methodological tears we will give an example of Teda Skocpol's classification, one of the most quoted researcher of the theory of

revolution. The author on external signs unites great French, Russian and Chinese revolutions in one group. All three revolutions, from the point of view of Skocpol, occurred in wealthy and politically ambitious agrarian states which distinguished: 1) weakness of an old regime's control system, 2) distribution of protest actions among the lowest classes, 3) attempts of political leaders by means of mass mobilization to establish revolutionary power. In all three countries internal structural contradictions were supplemented with crisis in the international relations, and as a result of revolutions the centralized bureaucratic states which have had an opportunity to become superpowers were created. The fundamental political tension in all three Old Regimes were the result not of contradiction between commercial-industrial classes and landed aristocracies, but of contradiction between producing classes and states, and in the relationships of the landed dominant classes to the autocratic-imperial states [Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, 1991, p. 41-48].

Except the remark on opportunity to become the superpowers, all other characteristics are inherent if not to everything, but to the majority of revolutions. "Opportunity to become superpowers" is very indistinct determinant, that also belongs more to a retrospective look of the researcher. Moreover, there are questions to historical interpretation. First, why not to attribute the same `opportunity` to English and Netherlands revolutions? Secondly, France belonged to the category of superstates of its time during Louis XIV era, not only in and after Bonaparte period. In the third, Russia appeared as a superstate at the time of World War I, and wasn't considered after revolution and Civil war. In the fourth, Russia and China didn't become superstates after revolution, for this purpose they needed some decades.

The question of contradictions and disagreements of elite and classes in Skocpol's representation looks even more disputable. First question: whom to call "the main producing class"? If on population volume, the main producing class before all revolutions was the peasantry, and it was related not only to France, Russia and China. If it ment to be "proletariat" (or "protoproletariat"), it wasn't a dominating class in no one revolution, probably, excepting the German revolutions of 1918-19 and revolutions of the end of the XX century in Eastern Europe. The second question, the conflict with the state, i.e., to the individual governor in a person of a king, a tsar, an emperor, or any collective government representing interests of narrow social groups, was the main move of all revolutions.

Disagreements of commerce and industry elite, i.e., capitalist elements, with land owners, i.e., a feudal caste, was the reason of revolutions according to Marx, modernized by the term "elite", but not changing an essence.

Thus, we observe attempts of systematization and allocation of types of revolutions, since the middle of the XIX century and till today. All these attempts are connected with aspiration to advance further studying "theory of revolution " which is impossible without similar sistemization. However all existing "systems of types" of revolutions don't possess uniform classifying determinant, or allow to wash away strongly borders of types, or don't include all features of last revolutions and, respectively, cause a set of questions and critical remarks. Despite the sesquicentennial period of systematization the problem of a typologization of revolutions remains unsolved and demands further development.

The indicator of a current state of studying of the theory of revolution and development of a typologization, in particular, is the assessment of events of so-called "velvet" and "color" revolutions.

It is accepted to see in `color revolutions` a mass protest and power change in Serbia (2001), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005), in this row stand also unfortunate attempts with the similar scenario: Belarus (2006), Armenia (2008), Russia (2012). Typologically events of so-called "Arab spring" belong to the phenomenon of color revolutions also. The name "Arab spring" was received by events in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East during December, 2010 – February, 2011, where mass protest actions passed (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Oman, insignificant protest actions occurred in Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti and Western Sahara), and, as a result, change of regime occurred in three countries: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (in Libya and Syria protest movement turned into civil war).

There is a certain tendency to estimate "color revolutions" as revolutions, not only in the self-name but also as definition of the phenomenon. The considerable group of researchers characterizes "color revolutions" on the former Soviet Union with the term `revolution` [see: Macievskij, 2010, s. 21; Stepanenko, 2005, s. 28, 29]. The events of "Arab spring" also received in literature the name of `waves of revolutions` or `a democratization wave` [see: Isaev, Shishkina, 2012b, p. 5]. There is no a consensus on revolution definition among researchers, but, anyway, revolution is admitted as basic changes society: in the political, economic,

social sphere [Clark, 1862, p. 5; Huntington, 1968, p. 264; Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, 1991, p. 4]. "Color revolutions" didn't bring any basic changes, they only made replacement of one ruling group (clan) by another.

One of the fashionable theories applied to events of "color revolutions" are theories of democratization and democratic transition, the transit theory [Macievskij, 2010, s. 23-24]. However there were no "further" democratization after any "color revolution", the set of actions and measures of all post-colored regimes was approximately identical and directed not on real changes, but on preservation of illusions of changes in society and maintenance of a rating of the power, populism of the first steps was quickly replaced by political hesitations and returned to former state status. One of the most popular opinion is to compare modern events in the Arab countries to events of the middle of the XIX century, known as "spring of the people", and process of disintegration of the socialist block in the 90th of the XX century [see Isaev, Shishkina, 2012b, p. 5]. However the listed historical events have in the basis essentially various reasons, character and, the main thing, consequences. Making a start from the main existing definitions of revolutions, to which "the Arab spring" in any way doesn't correspond, there were attempts to attribute to events of 2010-2011 revolutionism due to creation by them of conditions for emergence of new models of social and economic development and socio-political transformations [Bobohonov, 2012, p. 97; Vasil'ev, 2012, p. 8; Gonim, 2012, p. 4; Isaev, Shishkina, 2012a, p. 7; Korotaev, Zin'kina, 2012, p. 28; Filiu, 2011, p. 3; Tweets from Tahrir, 2011]. However these transformations didn't happen, and said opportunity (or belief in these opportunity) can be given by any change of the politician or party in power. Today even some authors, who have declared the events of Arab spring as revolutions admit the opposite assertion, fairly noting, that radical changes haven't been carried out, neither a social order has been changed, nor political [Gonim, 2012, p. 8; Gusarov, 2012, p. 26-27; Landa, 2012, p. 63].

Thus, events of all of "color revolutions", where events of the "Arab spring" also belong to, weren't revolutions, because they didn't change a political and social system, didn't create new models of social and economic development and socio-political transformations, didn't become a link in a "democratization" chain. In the result of all color revolutions the change of from one political (economic, political and economic) a clan on another happened, and a full or partial change of political elite. However,

it's not correct to consider power change during these events as simple coup d'état, what is typical to a large number of authors [e.g. Komleva, 2013, p. 20; Pochepcov, 2005, s. 10-11]. Coup d'état doesn't require a mass protest. Small group, as a rule, with support of power structures (army, special services). A social protest can accompany such events, they even can occur "on a wave" of protest actions, but the last, after all, isn't a necessary element.

Changes in result of a social protest and political revolution are real criterion of definition of accessory of this process to revolution, not just governors are changed, but the power and its principles. In case of incompleteness of revolutions in these questions, or if revolution "brought not there" (extreme states "to the left" or "to the right"), there are new "pushes", until necessary social and political process will come to the end. So, in England after the revolution of 1640-1660 "glorious revolution" of 1688 happened, in France, in order to "correct" all consequences of revolution of 1789-1799, three more revolutions were required: 1830, 1848-49 and 1871. In Russia after long revolution of 1905-1922 and nearly 70 years of "modernization" and conservation the revolution of 1991 became necessary.

Revolutions of 1989-1991 in Eastern Europe countries, "color revolutions" and events of the "Arab spring", which often compare [Komleva, 2013, p. 23; Macievskij, 2010, s. 21; Pochepcov, 2005, s. 7, 8-10; Fisun, 2006, s. 211-212; see also: Isaev, Shishkina, 2012b, p. 5], have essentially different nature. (The term "velvet revolutions", implicated on all "similar" events after revolution in Czechoslovakia in November-December, 1989 [e.g. Komleva, 2013, p. 23; Pochepcov, 2005, s. 7, 9-10], is not absolutely correct). Revolutions of the end of the 80th – the beginnings of the 90th in the countries of the socialist block and the USSR were revolutions that finished transformational processes of revolutions in these countries, which due to various circumstances "went off not there" ("took away to the left"). These revolutions changed political system, carried out transformations of economic system, finished changes of social structure. The "color revolutions" and "Arab spring" were not revolutions in any country, they happened.

Thus, lack of accurate definitions and approaches to systematization (in particular, typologization) of revolutions, leads to washing out of borders of the phenomenon, impossibility of uniform understanding of processes of their types and staging, this problem is defining in complex

studying of revolutions and is reproduced with research of each new revolution and the events applying for this socio-political term.

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